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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mitchell Nilan appeals the district dismissing 
intermediate appeal from the judgment entered upon his conditional guilty pleas 
to illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of an open 
container. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Nilan with illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor 
and possession of an open container. (R., pp.6, 19-20.) The public defender's 
office was appointed to represent Nilan on April 5, 2013, and Nilan entered not 
guilty pleas on that same date. (R., pp.2, 9.) On May 10, 2013, Nilan's 
appointed attorney filed a generic "Motion To Suppress Evidence," seeking 
suppression of "any and all evidence, admissions, confessions and/or 
statements made by and/or attributed to the defendant, which were illegally 
obtained as the result of an unlawful detention of the defendant." (R., pp.23-24.) 
The state opposed the motion "on the ground that it [was] untimely." (R., p.26.) 
Specifically, the state argued: 
The Defendant entered a not guilty plea on April 5, 2013. Pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d), the Defendant had twenty-eight days 
from that date to file any Rule 12(b) motions. The Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress was not filed until May 10, 2013, which is past 
the permissible time limit to file such a motion and the Defendant 
has thus far failed to establish good cause/excusable neglect for 
the untimely filing. 
(R., p.26.) Nilan's appointed attorney did not file a written response to the state's 
objection, but on June 17, 2013, she filed a "Supplemental Memorandum In 
1 
Support Of Motion To Suppress," arguing the merits of the suppression motion. 
(R., pp.29-35.) 
At a hearing on July 1, 2013, the magistrate heard argument regarding the 
timeliness of Nilan's suppression motion. (See generally 7 /1 /13 Tr. 1; R., pp.36-
37.) Appointed counsel acknowledged the motion was not timely filed but 
argued good cause existed to excuse the untimely filing because the 
suppression issue was "meritorious" and the state could not "show any 
prejudice." (7/1/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5, p.15, Ls.2-8.) Counsel also argued that, 
despite having received discovery from the state on April 16, 2013, and despite 
having actually filed a suppression motion on May 10, 2013, counsel was unable 
to ascertain all the facts to support the suppression motion until she spoke with 
her client at the pretrial conference on May 13, 2013. (7/1/13 Tr., p.16, L.1 -
p.17, L.15.) Finding Nilan's appointed attorney failed to demonstrate good cause 
or excusable neglect to justify the late filing, the magi~trate sustained the state's 
objection and declined to hear Nilan's untimely motion to suppress. (R., pp.36-
37.) 
Nilan thereafter entered conditional guilty pleas to both the illegal 
consumption and open container charges, reserving the right on appeal to 
challenge the magistrate's adverse ruling regarding his motion to suppress. (R., 
pp.42-43.) The magistrate accepted Nilan's pleas and entered a judgment, from 
which Nilan timely appealed. (R., pp.40, 45-47.) 
1 The transcript of the July 1, 2013 hearing has been included as an Exhibit to 
the record on appeal. (R., p.71.) 
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August 13, 2013, the district court entered an "Order Governing 
Appeal," ordering to file and serve his Appellant's brief "on 
or before December 2nd , 2013." , pp.50-51.) On December 2, 13, Nilan 
filed a "Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule." (R., pp.54-55.) The stipulation, 
which was signed by both Nilan's appointed attorney and the deputy city 
prosecutor, requested that the briefing schedule be "vacate[d] ... at the Court's 
convenience." (R., p.54.) The district court denied the request on December 6, 
2013 (R., p.54) and, on that same date, entered an order dismissing Nilan's 
appeal (R., pp.57-58). Nilan's appointed attorney filed a motion for 
reconsideration and an affidavit in support thereof, asking the court to reconsider 
its order dismissing the appeal and setting forth the "reasons for and grounds as 
to why an extension" of time for filing the Appellant's brief was necessary. (R., 
pp.59-61, 63-64.) The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, 
stating in a handwritten notation on the face of the motion that Nilan had made 
"no showing of good cause." (R., p.59 (capitalization altered).) Nilan filed a 
notice of appeal, timely from the district court's orders dismissing his 
intermediate appeal and denying his motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.65-70.) 
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ISSUES 
Nilan states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Nilan's Stipulation for New Briefing Schedule on December 
6, 2013 and when it denied his Motion for Reconsideration 
on December 20, 2013? 
II. Did the District Court violate Mr. Nilan's right to Due Process 
of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, when it dismissed his 
appeal on December 6, 2013? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Nilan failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule, dismissing his 
appeal for failing to timely file his Appellant's brief, and denying his motion for 
reconsideration? 
2. Has Nilan failed to establish a due process violation resulting from the 
dismissal of his intermediate appeal? 
3. If the district court erred, should its order of dismissal nevertheless be 
affirmed on the alternative basis that Nilan is not entitled to relief on the merits of 




Nilan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request For An Extension Of The Briefing Schedule, Dismissing His 
Appeal, And Denying His Motion For Reconsideration 
Introduction 
Nilan argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his request 
for an extension of time to file his Appellant's brief, dismissing his appeal for 
failing to failing to timely file his Appellant's brief, and denying his motion for 
reconsideration. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) A review of the record and of the 
applicable law shows Nilan has failed to establish and abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for extension of time for 
filing an appellate brief is a matter within the appellate court's discretion. See 
I.AR. 34(e), 46; I.C.R. 54.15, 54.18. Likewise, "[t]he sanctions for failing to 
diligently prosecute an appeal from the magistrate division are discretionary with 
the district court; an exercise of sound judicial discretion will not be disturbed on 
appeal." State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115,117,785 P.2d 679,681 (Ct. App. 
1990) (citations omitted). 
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C. Nilan Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request For An Extension Of Time, Dismissing His Appeal, 
And Denying His Motion For Reconsideration 
1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Nilan's 
Unsupported And/Or Inadequately Supported Requests For An 
Extension Of The Briefing Schedule 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.15 provides that, in an appeal from the magistrate 
division to the district court, appellate briefs "shall be ... filed and served within 
the times provided for appeals to the Supreme Court by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, unless otherwise ordered by the district court." The criminal rules do not 
specifically provide for extensions of time for the filing of appellate briefs to the 
district court. However, Idaho Appellate Rule 34(e), applicable to the criminal 
rules by virtue of I.C.R. 54.18, states: 
A motion for extension of time for filing a brief may be made 
no later than the due date for the appellate brief and shall be 
supported by an affidavit setting forth: 
(1) The date when the brief is due; 
(2) The number of extensions of time previously granted, and if 
extensions were granted the original date when the brief was due; 
(3) Whether any previous requests for extensions of time have 
been denied or denied in part; 
(4) The reasons or grounds why an extension is necessary; 
(5) The number of days of extension deemed necessary and 
the date on which the brief would become due; 
(6) Whether there has been any stipulation of the parties for 
this application for extension, which stipulation shall not be binding 
upon the Court; 
(7) The position of the opposing parties concerning the 
application, and whether or not the opposing parties have verbally 
expressed the agreement or disagreement; 
(8) What assurance there is that the brief will be filed within the 
extended time requested. 
I.AR. 34(e). The decision whether to grant an extension of time for filing an 
appellate brief is discretionary. I.AR. 34(e), 46. The appellate rules make clear, 
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that such extensions "shall not be favored" and may be granted "only 
upon a showing good cause." I.AR. 34(e); also I.AR. 46 (motion for 
extension time to appellate brief enlarged . . . for good cause 
shown upon the motion of a party"). 
In this case, the district court entered an order requiring Nilan to file his 
appellant's brief "on or before December 2nd , 2013." (R., p.50.) Nilan did not file 
his appellant's brief by the prescribed deadline. Instead, on the day his brief was 
due, Nilan filed a "Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule" in which Nilan's 
attorney and the deputy city prosecutor indicated only that they "stipulate[d] and 
agree[d] to vacate the current briefing schedule at the Court's convenience." (R., 
pp.54-55.) The district court denied the stipulation and Nilan's subsequent 
motion for reconsideration, ultimately finding Nilan failed to carry his burden of 
showing "good cause" for the requested extension. (R., pp.54, 59.) Contrary to 
Nilan's assertions, a review of the record supports the district court's decisions to 
deny Nilan's motions because Nilan failed to make the requisite showing of 
"good cause" justifying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule. 
When Nilan requested an extension of the briefing schedule, he had 
already been given more than three months in which to file his appellant's brief. 
(Compare R., p.50 (Order Governing Procedure On Appeal, filed August 13, 
2013) with R., p.54 (Stipulation For New Briefing Schedule, filed December 2, 
2013).) Although the deputy city prosecutor stipulated to the request, the written 
stipulation failed to set forth any information from which the district court could 
make an informed decision regarding whether there was good cause to justify an 
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extension. (R., p.54.) The stipulation did not set forth the date on which the brief 
was originally due, the reasons or grounds why an extension was necessary, the 
number of days of extension deemed necessary, or what assurance there was 
that the brief would be filed within the extended time requested. (R., p.54.) Nor 
was the stipulation accompanied by an affidavit setting forth any of the foregoing 
information as required by I.A.R. 34(e). Because Nilan failed to comply with the 
specific requirements of I.AR. 34(e) and did not otherwise even attempt to make 
a showing of good cause to justify an extension of time, the district court acted 
well within its discretion in denying Nilan's original request for an extension of the 
briefing schedule. 
The court also acted within its discretion in denying Nilan's motion for 
reconsideration. In an apparent attempt to remedy her failure to provide an 
affidavit supporting the original request for an extension of the briefing schedule, 
Nilan's attorney supported the motion for reconsideration with an affidavit setting 
forth several "reasons for and grounds as to why an extension [was] necessary." 
(R., pp.63-64.) Specifically, counsel cited an "[u]nexpected family illness," 
"[p]reviously scheduled time out of state," a large caseload, work on other 
appellate cases, and inadequate time to research and prepare the brief in Nilan's 
case as the bases of her request for an extension. (R., pp.63-64.) Nilan argues 
on appeal that these reasons necessarily amounted to a showing of "good 
cause" justifying his request for an extension of the briefing schedule. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6 n.1.) The district court obviously disagreed, however. 
(See R., p.59 (motion for reconsideration denied because "no showing of good 
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cause" (capitalization altered)).) Contrary to Nilan's assertions, the record 
the district court's decision. 
Most of the reasons attorney cited being unable to complete 
the brief by the December 2013 deadline related to events that occurred in the 
latter part of October and all of November 2013. (R., pp.63-64.) The briefing 
schedule had been set in mid-August 2013, however, thereby giving Nilan's 
attorney more than three months in which to complete the brief by the prescribed 
deadline. Nilan's attorney did not even attempt in her affidavit to explain why she 
had not begun working on Nilan's appellant's brief before October or November. 
Nor did she include in the affidavit any information regarding the number of 
additional days she deemed necessary to file the brief or any assurance that the 
brief would be filed with the requested extension of time. Given the lack of these 
details, all of which were required by I.A.R. 34(e), the district court could 
reasonably conclude that the circumstances that prevented Nilan's attorney from 
working on and/or completing the brief in the several weeks leading up to the 
December 2nd deadline - many of which were presumably known to Nilan's 
attorney when the briefing schedule was set - did not constitute "good cause" 
/ justifying an extension of the briefing deadline for some further unknown period 
of time beyond the three months Nilan's attorney had already been given. 
Nilan recognizes the district court had discretion to deny his request for an 
extension of the briefing schedule. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) He argues, however, 
that because the court had "recently accepted a stipulation for a new briefing 
schedule" in an entirely separate case in which "[t]he parties followed a similar 
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procedure," the court should likewise have accepted the stipulation in this case. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) Nilan's argument is without merit. Whatever the court 
did or did not do in relation to a stipulation for an extension of a briefing schedule 
in a different case is irrelevant to whether the court acted within its discretion in 
this case in denying Nilan's request for an extension. Because Nilan never 
supported the request for an extension (either originally or in relation to his 
motion for reconsideration) with an affidavit meeting the requirements of I.A.R. 
34(e), the district court acted well within its discretion in denying the request for 
an extension. This is true even though the parties stipulated to the request. See 
I.A.R. 34(e)(6) (a "stipulation of the parties for [an] application for extension ... 
shall not be binding upon the Court"). Nilan has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion. 
2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Dismissing 
Nilan's Appeal As A Sanction For Nilan's Failure To Timely File His 
Appellant's Brief 
"Dismissal of an appeal is a permissible sanction when the appellant fails 
to file a timely brief." Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (citing I.A.R. 21; I.R.C.P. 83(s)); accord I.C.R. 54.13; Woods v. 
Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798 (1980); State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 
117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990) (Per Curiam). The decision whether to 
sua sponte dismiss an appeal for the failure to file a timely appellant's brief lies 
within the appellate court's discretion. Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at 
681. But see McNett v. McNett, 95 Idaho 59, 501 P.2d 1059 (1972) (party 
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dismissal of appeal opposing party's failure to timely file appellant's 
In Langdon, the sua sponte Langdon's 
intermediate appeal after Langdon failed to timely file his appellant's brief. 117 
Idaho at 116, 785 P.2d at 680. Langdon appealed the order of dismissal, 
arguing he never received notice of the date on which his brief was due. 
Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at 681. Because the record reflected the 
notice was accompanied by an affidavit of service certifying that copies of the 
notice were sent to both the prosecutor's office and Langdon's attorney, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals concluded "the district judge [could not] be faulted for 
assuming that Langdon's attorney had chosen to ignore the established deadline 
for filing a brief." & The Court also rejected, as being unsupported by the 
record, Langdon's assertion that the county clerk failed to actually mail Langdon 
the notice informing him of the briefing deadline. & "Although the district judge 
could have imposed a less onerous sanction under the circumstances," the Court 
of Appeals "[found] no reason to reverse his ruling based upon the record before 
him" and, therefore, did "not disturb the order dismissing Langdon's appeal." kl 
In this case, as in Langdon, the district court sua sponte dismissed Nilan's 
appeal after Nilan failed to timely file his appellant's brief. (R., pp.57-58.) Nilan 
argues this was an abuse of discretion, claiming that, in contrast to the facts of 
Langdon, "[t]he circumstances in this case are that the appellant did not just 
ignore a deadline, or not seek to file any briefing with the court," but instead 
"followed the proscribed [sic] appellate rules of procedure by asking for a 
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continuance of time in which to file the briefing." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) The 
state acknowledges Nilan sought an of extension of time in which to file his 
appellant's brief; but, in doing so, he in no way followed the applicable rules of 
appellate procedure. As set forth in more detail in the preceding section, Nilan's 
original request for an extension was not accompanied by any affidavit at all, 
much less one satisfying the requirements of I.A.R. 34(e). Without having been 
provided any information from which to determine whether there was good cause 
to grant an extension, the district court was in no better position than the court in 
Langdon and was left to assume that Nilan had merely chosen to ignore or, at 
best, arbitrarily change the established briefing deadline without any basis for 
doing so. Considering the record before it at the time, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing Nilan's appeal as a sanction for 
failing to timely file his brief. 
Citing Langdon, Nilan also appears to argue that the district court abused 
its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his appeal without giving him "prior notice 
and [an] opportunity to be heard." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) This argument is 
without merit. As already discussed, the Langdon Court upheld a sua sponte 
order of dismissal as being within the district court's discretion, and it did so 
despite the fact that the district court did not give Langdon prior notice of its 
intent to dismiss his appeal. Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117, 785 P.2d at 681. The 
Court then addressed, as a separate issue, whether the district court erred by 
refusing to allow Landon to file a timely petition for rehearing. 1st at 117-18, 785 
P.2d at 681-82. Addressing that question, the Langdon Court held that the 
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an appeal, "without 
a concerning 
circumstance" requiring that 
notice and opportunity to be heard or to file 
dismissal, represents an extraordinary 
appellant be given "an opportunity seek 
court's reconsideration." l.9.:_at 118,785 P.2d at 682. 
Unlike Langdon, who was prohibited from seeking reconsideration, Nilan 
filed a motion for reconsideration asking for relief from the court's order of 
dismissal. (R., pp.59-61, 63-64.) By entertaining that motion, the court gave 
Nilan the opportunity to be heard regarding the reasons the appeal should not be 
dismissed, which is all that Langdon requires. That the court ultimately denied 
the motion on its merits does not establish an abuse of discretion. Nilan never 
complied with the requirements of I.AR 34(e) - either in relation to his original 
request for an extension of the briefing schedule or in conjunction with his motion 
for reconsideration. Having failed to make the requisite showing of good cause 
for extending the briefing schedule, Nilan cannot show that the court abused its 
discretion by declining to reconsider its order dismissing Nilan's appeal for failing 
to file a timely appellant's brief. 
11. 
Nilan Has Failed To Establish A Due Process Violation Resulting From The 
Dismissal Of His Intermediate Appeal 
A Introduction 
Nilan argues the district court violated his right to procedural due process 
by dismissing his intermediate appeal without giving him prior notice and a 
reasonable period of time within which to file his appellant's brief. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-9.) Nilan's argument fails. By entertaining Nilan's motion for 
13 
reconsideration, the district court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process he was 
in relation to the dismissal of his appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. 
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted). 
C. Nilan's Claim Of A Due Process Violation Fails Because He Was 
Ultimately Given Notice Of And An Opportunity To Be Heard Regarding 
The Dismissal Of His Appeal 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Procedural due process requires that, except in extraordinary circumstances, "a 
person, whose protected rights are being adjudicated," must receive notice and 
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
State v. Smith, 146 Idaho 822, 828, 203 P.3d 1221, 1227 (2009) (citations 
omitted). "Protected liberty interests can arise from two sources, either the Due 
Process Clause or the laws of the states." Lightner v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712, 
717, 239 P.3d 817, 822 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. V. 
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). "When the language of state statutes 
and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection." !Q,_ 
(citing Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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that because his right to appeal his conditional plea 
statute, he "is invested with a protected liberty interest in 
statutory right to appeal" and "cannot constitutionally be deprived of this interest 
without procedures which provide him due process." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) He 
further contends that, by sua sponte dismissing his intermediate appeal without 
giving him prior notice or a reasonable period of time within which to file his 
appellant's brief, the district court violated his rights to procedural due process. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Nilan's argument fails. Even assuming he was 
entitled to the protections of procedural due process in relation to the dismissal 
of his appeal, the record shows the court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process 
he was due. 
After the district court dismissed Nilan's appeal for failing to file a timely 
appellant's brief, Nilan filed a motion for reconsideration, and an affidavit in 
support thereof, setting forth the arguments and facts that he believed 
countenanced against the dismissal of his appeal. (R., pp.59-61.) The district 
court entertained the motion but ultimately denied it, concluding Nilan had made 
"no showing of good cause" justifying either an extension of time or 
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. (R., p.59.) By entertaining Nilan's 
request for an extension and then his motion to reconsider, the district court 
ultimately gave Nilan notice of and an opportunity to be heard regarding the 
2 Nilan was also put on notice by I.C.R. 54.13 and I.AR. 21 that his appeal could 
be dismissed if he failed to timely file his appellant's brief. 
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contemplated reasons for dismissal before finally disposing of Nilan's appeal. 
Compare Langdon, 117 Idaho at 117-18, 785 P.2d at 681-82 (permitting 
appellant to seek reconsideration of court's sua sponte order dismissal 
effective to remedy court's failure to give prior notice and opportunity to be heard 
concerning reasons for dismissal). Having been afforded such notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, Nilan has failed to establish any violation of his due 
process rights. 
Nilan argues that the district court was required, as a matter of procedural 
due process, to not only afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the proposed bases for dismissal, but also to afford him a reasonable 
time within which to file his appellant's brief before dismissing his appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) This argument is frivolous. As previously stated, 
procedural due process requires only that a person receive notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a protected right. Smith, 146 
Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. While Nilan had a statutory right to appeal, he 
did not have the right to file an untimely appellant's brief. Indeed, the appellate 
rules specifically provide for dismissal as a permissible sanction for failing to 
timely take any step in the appellate process. I.AR. 21; I.C.R. 54.13. Because 
Nilan failed to comply with the appellate rules, the district court had discretion to 
dismiss Nilan's appeal without first affording Nilan the opportunity to file a 
belated brief. That the court did so, after giving Nilan the opportunity to respond 
in his motion for reconsideration to the basis for dismissal, does not constitute a 
violation of Nilan's due process rights. 
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district court ultimately afforded Nilan all the process he was 
in the his intermediate appeal, Nilan has 
for reversal. 
111. 
If The Court Erred, Its Order Of Dismissal Should Nevertheless Be 
Affirmed On The Alternative Basis That Nilan Is Not Entitled To Relief 
On The Merits Of The Only Issue He Preserved For Appeal 
A. Introduction 
to 
When Nilan entered his conditional guilty pleas to the charges in this 
case, the only issue he preserved for appeal was whether the magistrate abused 
its discretion by declining to entertain his untimely motion to suppress. (R., 
pp.42-43.) By dismissing Nilan's appeal, the district court effectively denied 
Nilan relief as to this issue. For the reasons set forth in Sections II and 111, supra, 
the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Nilan's due process 
rights by dismissing his intermediate appeal. If this Court disagrees, the district 
court's order of dismissal should nevertheless be affirmed on the alternative 
basis that Nilan is not entitled to relief on the merits of the appeal - i.e., Nilan 
cannot show from the record that the magistrate abused its discretion in 
declining to hear his untimely motion to suppress. See Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 
Idaho 1091, 1092, 793 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Ct. App. 1990) (because effect of order 
dismissing intermediate appeal "was simply to deny relief on appeal," Court of 
Appeals could uphold the order of dismissal upon a determination that the 
appellant "was not entitled to relief, in any event, on the merits of the appeal"). 
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Standard Of Review 
A trial court's decision whether to enlarge the time for filing a motion to 
suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 
_, 319 P.3d 1191, 1192-93 (2014). The appellate court will "uphold the trial 
court's decision when the court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." kl at _, 319 P.3d at 93 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
C. The Magistrate Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Nilan's 
Motion To Suppress On The Basis That It Was Not Timely Filed 
Motions to suppress evidence "must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days 
after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever is 
earlier." I.C.R. 12(b), (d). Nilan pied not guilty on April 5, 2013, and his trial was 
set for June 6, 2013. (R., pp.2, 9.) Pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), Nilan's motion to 
suppress was due no later than May 3, 2013, which was the earlier of the two 
dates contemplated by I.C.R. 12(d). Nilan did not, however, file his motion until 
May 10, 2013, seven days after the time for filing the motion expired. (R., pp.23-
24.) 
Although I.C.R. 12(d) allows the district court to enlarge the time for filing 
a Rule 12(b) motion, in exercising that discretion, the court must find that the 
defendant has shown good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d). After a 
hearing at which Nilan was given the opportunity to demonstrate good cause or 
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an enlargement of time, the magistrate found Nilan 
A review of the record of 
supports that determination. 
The only reasons Nilan's attorneys offered as justifying the late filing were 
that the suppression motion was "meritorious," that the state could not "show any 
prejudice," and that, despite having received discovery from the state on April 16, 
2013, counsel was unable to ascertain all the facts to support the suppression 
motion until she spoke with her client at the pretrial conference on May 13, 2013. 
(7/1/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5, p.15, Ls.2-8, p.16, L.1 - p.17, L.15.) None of these 
reasons demonstrated good cause or excusable neglect justifying an 
enlargement of time. See State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102, 
1104 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) clearly requires either good 
cause or excusable neglect to be shown by a party who has missed the 
prescribed deadlines. Allowing untimely motions to be heard because they 
appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the rule."); State v. Irving, 118 
Idaho 673, 674, 799 P.2d 471, 472 (Ct. App. 1990) (no showing of good cause 
or excusable neglect where, despite lack of prejudice to state, and despite 
state's failure to timely provide discovery, defendant was in possession of 
information upon which to base a suppression motion before filing deadline). 
Because Nilan never offered an explanation for the delay that could have formed 
the basis of a finding of good cause or excusable neglect, the magistrate did not 
abuse its discretion by denying Nilan's motion to suppress on the basis that it 
was untimely. 
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Because Nilan is not entitled to relief from the magistrate's order denying 
motion to suppress as untimely, the district court's order dismissing Nilan's 
intermediate appeal should be affirmed on this basis. Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 
Idaho 1091, 1092, 793 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Avelar, 129 
Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the 
correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the 
correct theory). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order dismissing Nilan's intermediate appeal. 
DATED this 9th day of September 2014. 
I A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney G 
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